losses beyond a period of unemployment following their job losses. First, workers possessing skills that were especially suited to their old positons are likely to be less productive, at least initially, in their subsequent jobs. Such a fit between workers' skills and the requirements of their old jobs could have resulted from on-the-job investment in firm-specific human capital or from costly search resulting in particularly good matches with their old firms.2 Second, workers losing jobs that paid wage premiums are likely to earn less if their subsequent jobs pay standard wages. Such wage premiums could have arisen because of direct or threat effects of unions or because such premiums directly raised workers' productivity on their old jobs.3 Finally, displaced workers' long-term earnings will be lower if, on their previous jobs, they had accepted wages below their level of productivity in return for higher earnings later in their careers. Workers might have accepted such "tilted" tenure profiles in order to enhance their employers' incentives to invest in their human capital (see e.g., Edward P. Lazear, 1981).
Our study focuses on high-tenure workers because they are the ones most likely to have accumulated substantial amounts of firm-specific human or "match" capital prior to their job losses. Likewise, because wage premiums and deferred compensation are likely to decrease turnover, high-tenure workers are more likely than others to experience losses for these reasons as well. However, beyond suggesting which workers are likely to lose the most, the theories mentioned above do not provide much guidance to policymakers and others as to the magnitude and persistence of displaced workers' earnings losses. To answer such questions requires empirical work like that presented in this article. Indeed, research on the pattern of displaced workers' losses may shed some light on the importance of those theories more generally.
Many studies, including several using the Displaced Worker Survey (DWS) supplements to the Current Population Survey (CPS) (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1988), find that workers characterizing themselves as displaced frequently report significantly lower earnings on their new jobs.4 However, the DWS has several shortcomings that make it difficult to use in assessing the magnitude and temporal pattern of displaced workers' earnings losses. These shortcomings include the lack of a comparison group of nondisplaced workers, the lack of extensive predisplacement earnings data, and a documented tendency for workers not to report more remote instances of displacement (see e.g., Robert H. Topel, 1990) . Recently, Christopher J. Ruhm (1991) avoided these problems by using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to document significant long-term effects of displacement. We go beyond his work by employing a more comprehensive statistical methodology and by documenting how the estimated earnings losses vary over time and among workers. This added detail should aid assessments of the varied theoretical explanations for the earnings losses discussed above.
To develop this detailed picture, we created an unusual longitudinal data set by merging administrative records covering 52 quarters of workers' earnings histories with information about their firms. The resulting data set contains quarterly earnings histories for a large number of high-tenure displaced and nondisplaced workers, including those who remained employed at displaced workers' former firms. As we explain below, these data offer several advantages over those used in other studies.
Like previous researchers, we find that high-tenure workers incur large losses when they separate from distressed firms. However, we also find a consistent temporal pattern to these losses in which displaced workers' relative earnings begin to decline substantially three years prior to their separations, drop sharply when they actually leave their jobs, and then rise rapidly during the six quarters immediately following their separations. After that point, however, these workers' earnings recover very slowly, so that five years after separating from their former firms, their losses still amount to 25 percent of their predisplacement earnings. This finding of large losses holds for virtually every group of workers that we examine, including males and females, as well as younger and older workers. The losses exhibit greater variability among workers displaced from different industries and sizes of firms and amidst different local labor-market conditions. Nevertheless, our basic finding holds for workers formerly employed across a broad spectrum of industries and labormarket conditions. Further, even those who find work in the same industries as their old jobs experience large earnings losses.
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. In Section I we describe our longitudinal data and comment on some of their strengths and shortcomings. In Section II we discuss the statistical issues involved in estimating the earnings losses incurred by displaced workers. In Section III we present estimates of the earnings losses for hightenure workers who separated from their firms during the early and mid-1980's. Some concluding remarks follow in Section IV.
I. The Pennsylvania Data
The statistical framework developed in this article applies generally to the problem of estimating earnings losses for displaced workers. However, our empirical work assesses the magnitude and pattern of those losses only for workers displaced in Pennsylvania during the early and mid-1980's. We have limited our analysis to these workers in order to take advantage of a rich set of administrative data on Pennsylvanian workers and their firms. By combining quarterly earnings histories for a 5-percent sample of the state's workers with their firms' employment data, we have created a data set that contains workers' quarterly earnings extending from 1974 through 1986 as well as information about their firms, including employment levels and growth, geographic location, and "four-digit SIC" industry.5 By observing changes in the sources of earnings we are able to date with relative accuracy the quarter in which some workers separate from their employers, as well as to identify other workers who remain continuously employed by a single firm.
These administrative data have several advantages over data used in other studies. First, we have a large sample of nondisplaced workers. This allows us to borrow statistical techniques from the programevaluation literature in order to obtain more reliable estimates of the cost of displacement, including the cost related to the earnings growth that workers would have received in the absence of job loss. Second, we are able to track workers' quarterly earnings over a relatively long period of time. This allows us to distinguish short-term from long-term losses and also to be more confident that our results are free of statistical biases.6 Third, we have data on a much larger number of workers than are followed in the PSID or the National Longitudinal Surveys (NLS). This allows us to provide useful results for relatively narrowly defined groups of workers. Finally, we have information on employment changes in workers' firms. This allows us to identify workers who separated from distressed firms. Such workers are likely to have been displaced, rather than to have quit or been dismissed for cause.
5For details on how we constructed our data see the Appendix.
6One interpretation of the exchange between LaLonde (1986) and James J. Heckman and V. Joseph Hotz (1989) is that reliable nonexperimental estimation of program impacts requires data on workers a substantial amount of time prior to their participation.
Our Pennsylvania data set also allows us to avoid two problems inherent in the use of the standard survey-based data sets. First, earnings data in the CPS and PSID are reported by workers with significant error, while our data are based on firms' reports that are used to calculate tax liabilities and are presumably virtually free of measurement error (see Greg J. Duncan and Daniel H. Hill, 1985; John Bound and Alan B. Krueger, 1991). Second, workers in the DWS are less likely to report instances of job loss, the longer that the displacement occurred prior to the interview date. If, as seems likely, the less severe setbacks are the ones that are not reported, it becomes difficult to use these data to determine the rate of recovery from job loss. By contrast, our administrative data allow us to identify all separations experienced by workers.
Of course, there are also some disadvantages associated with the use of our data set. Most obviously, we have data only on Pennsylvanian workers. Although we cannot be sure that our findings for these workers reflect the experiences of displaced workers generally, it is worth noting that Pennsylvania is a large state with a diverse industrial base. Further, during the 1980's-the period covered by this study-the economic performance of the eastern half of the state, which shared in the growth experienced by the other middle-Atlantic states and New England, was considerably better than that of the western half, which experienced double-digit unemployment rates (see Jacobson, 1988 ). This variation allows us to determine how losses depend on local labor-market conditions and, by extension, the importance of our restriction to Pennsylvanian workers.
Another disadvantage of our data is that demographic information on workers is limited to their sex and date of birth. By comparison, data sets such as the DWS or the PSID include a wider array of characteristics, among them workers' educational attainments, their occupations, and their marital and union statuses. The statistical techniques that we employ below account for unobserved heterogeneity in ways that ensure that our lack of such information does not lead to any biases in our estimates of average losses. However, lack of data does limit the extent to which we can learn how earnings losses vary among different demographic groups. Similarly, lack of data prevents us from decomposing earnings losses into effects due to lower wages and reduced hours. However, even given our data limitations, we are able to provide a substantially more complete assessment of the determinants of long-term earnings losses than has previously been possible.
Another possible shortcoming of our data is that they do not explicitly identify whether workers' separations resulted from quits, discharges for cause, or displacements.7 In order to minimize these ambiguities, we constructed a "mass-layoff" sample that includes separators whose firms' employment in the year following their departure was 30-percent or more below their maximum levels during the late 1970's.8 This definition encompasses firms that closed around the time of workers' separations, as well as others that had large employment declines. Although some employees from the masslayoff sample may have quit their jobs or been discharged for cause, the vast majority probably separated involuntarily from their firm for economic reasons.
Finally, our data's most important disadvantage is that it is impossible to distinguish 7In related research Jacobson (1991) found that, between 1977 and 1987, the rate of separations for workers from Allegheny County (Pittsburgh) was 80 percent for workers with less than one year of tenure, 43 percent for workers with one year of tenure, 24 percent for workers with two or three years of tenure, and 13 percent for workers with four or more years of tenure. For those with four or more years of tenure, one-half of the separations were estimated to be retirements, and one-third were estimated to be displacements. Thus the quit rate for that group would be about 2 percent per year.
8This categorization of workers is less sensible for those from small firms. Accordingly we further restricted our sample to those whose firms had at least 50 employees in 1979. We have experimented with other similar definitions of "mass-layoff" and obtained results similar to those presented here.
between workers who leave the Pennsylvanian wage and salary work force and workers who remain unemployed for long periods of time. In our administrative data base, both groups of workers have zero earnings. For the unemployed, those earnings are their actual earnings; but, for workers who moved out of the state, became self-employed, or were working under a different social-security number, zero clearly understates their actual earnings.9 Therefore, to avoid overstating workers' earnings losses we have eliminated from our sample the approximately 25 percent of high-tenure separators who subsequently never have positive earnings in our data. Because some of those workers probably were unemployed, we believe that this decision biases downward our displacement-cost estimates. Without this sample restriction, our estimates of the losses would be approximately 15 percentage points larger. Alternatively, even with this sample restriction, we might overstate losses if the most resilient workers are significantly more likely to move out of the state. However, we discount this latter possibility because, before their separations, the excluded workers had similar characteristics to the rest of the sample. Moreover, in results not reported in this article, we find that displaced workers who move within Pennsylvania actually experience somewhat larger than average losses.
To construct the sample of workers analyzed in this article, first we identified those workers who had six or more years of tenure by the beginning of 1980. Second, we restricted our sample to workers for whom we had information on their age and sex and, to avoid complications associated with early retirement, to workers born between 1930 and 1959. Finally, to reduce biases due to sample attrition, we required that every worker receive some wage or salary earnings during each calendar year. This restriction ensures that the losses we observe result from wage and hours changes instead of differing rates of nonemployment or missing earnings data. As we have noted, its potential drawback is that the excluded separators may suffer systematically larger or smaller losses.10
As shown by panel A of There are at least two ways to interpret the differences between stayers' and separators' earnings patterns. One interpretation is that because the earnings of displaced and nondisplaced workers were nearly the same during the mid-1970's, their earningsrelated characteristics also must have been similar and, absent some adverse event, their earnings would have remained similar for the rest of the sample period.1" Accordingly, the earnings differences between the two groups that emerge in the late 1970's and persist for the rest of the sample period should be interpreted as losses due to displacement or, more precisely, as losses due to the events that led to workers' displacements. Alternatively, the divergence between the two groups' earnings starting in the late 1970's might indicate that separators had more slowly growing earnings before their displacement and would have continued to have had slow earnings growth even without being displaced. Under this interpretation, some or all of the postdisplacement earnings gap between separators and stayers would have existed even if there had been no separation. We argue below that the first interpretation is the appropriate one.
II. Statistical Models of Earnings Losses
In this section, we develop a statistical framework for summarizing the evidence on the magnitude and the temporal and crosssectional patterns of displaced workers' earnings losses. We begin by specifying more precisely our definition of displaced workers' earnings losses. Next we describe our statistical model. Finally, we discuss the circumstances that may lead to biases in our estimates.
A. Definition of Earnings Losses
Many displaced-worker studies measure losses as the difference between workers' earnings in some postdisplacement period and their earnings in a period shortly before separation. There are three reasons why this measure may not capture the full effects of structural or public-policy changes on workers' earnings. First, this measure does not control for macroeconomic factors that cause changes in workers' earnings regardless of whether they are displaced. Second, this measure does not account for the earnings growth that would have occurred in the absence of job loss; in the long term, workers' earnings may return to their predisplacement levels, but not to the levels expected prior to their job losses. Finally, firms' declining fortunes may adversely affect workers' earnings several years prior to their job losses. Therefore, to capture the full effect of the events that lead to workers' displacements, it is important to calculate their earnings declines relative to a point several years prior to their separations.
In this study, we define displaced workers' earnings losses to be the difference between their actual and expected earnings had the events that led to their job losses not occurred. To make this definition more precise, we let yi, denote the earnings of worker i at date t and let Di, = 1 if worker i was displaced at date s (and Di s = 0 otherwise). Our definition of earnings loss is the change in expected earnings if, several periods prior to date s, it was revealed that the worker would be displaced at date s rather than being able to keep his or her job indefinitely. More formally, our definition of the loss is where Ii 5_p is the information available at date s -p, and p is sufficiently large that the events that eventually lead to displacement would have not begun by date s -p. This definition of workers' earnings losses allows the events that lead to workers' displacements to affect earnings prior to separation. In addition, our definition compares displacement at date s to an alternative that rules out displacement at date s and at any time in the future.12 This choice ensures that we compare different cohorts of job losers' earnings to a common standard and simplifies the interpretation of several of our empirical results.13
The magnitude and interpretation of workers' earnings losses also depend on the variables in the information set Ii _p. To the extent that we can, we want to control for the standard demographic variables that influence earnings. In addition, our data set allows us to condition on displaced workers' former industries and even on their former firms. However, the danger in using a measure that conditions on workers' industries or firms is that even the workers who retain their jobs in industries or firms that permanently lay off other workers may themselves experience some earnings losses. Thus, if we conditioned on these variables, we might obtain relatively small displacement-effects estimates simply because workers who lost their jobs were hurt only a little more than those who kept their jobs. For example, if policy changes cause both displaced and nondisplaced workers' earnings to decline, an earnings-loss measure that controls for workers' industries or firms does not capture the full impact of those changes. Instead it captures only the effects specifically associated with workers' job losses.
Another way to make this point is to note that, in order to understand the importance of workers' attachments to particular firms, we must observe variation in outcomes for similar workers in different firms. This is impossible if we assume that workers are similar only when they work for the same firm. Therefore, we define displaced workers' earnings losses by conditioning only on general characteristics that would, at date s -p, be expected to affect earnings at date t. Nevertheless, we also report estimates that condition explicitly on workers' firms, because the difference between the two estimates provides an indirect estimate of the magnitude of losses imposed by structural changes on workers who retain their jobs.
B. The Statistical Model
To estimate the earnings losses corresponding to our definition we specify a statistical model to represent workers' earnings histories and identify the displacement effect with a subset of the model's parameters. Our specification is intended to exploit two of the principal strengths of our data set-that it covers a long period of time-and that it contains data on many individualsso as to obtain a very detailed picture of the pattern of earnings losses across both time and workers.
In order to allow our estimates to vary across both time and worker characteristics, we pool information for workers displaced between 1980 and 1986. A convenient way to do this is to introduce a series of dummy variables for the number of quarters before or after workers' separations. Accordingly, we let Dik = 1 if, in period t, worker i had been displaced k quarters earlier (or, if k is negative, worker i was displaced -k quarters later).14 By restricting attention to these dummy variables, we formalize the idea that a worker displaced in 1982 was in much the 12Because our data end after 1986, we have no way of knowing whether some nondisplaced workers were displaced in 1987 or beyond. Therefore, our alternative rules out displacement at date s, and at any time through 1986. 13In Ruhm (1991), on the other hand, displacement at a given date is compared to an average that includes workers displaced at other dates. Our first statistical specification assumes that workers' earnings at a given date depend on displacement through the set of previously defined dummy variables and on some controls for fixed and time-varying characteristics:
(2) yit = ai + yt +xitP + E Dkitk + eit.
k2-m
In (2), the dummy variables, Dkt, k= -im, -(m-1),...,0,1,2,..., jointly represent the event of displacement. In particular, Sk is the effect of displacement on a worker's earnings k quarters following its occurrence.15 In the empirical work that follows, we allow displacement to affect earnings up to 20 quarters prior to separation. 16 The vector xit consists of the observed, time-varying characteristics of the worker, which in this article are limited to the interactions among sex, age, and age squared. The ye's are the coefficients of a set of dummy variables for each quarter in the sample period that capture the general time pattern of earnings in the economy. The "fixed effect," ai, summarizes the impact of permanent differences among workers in observed and unobserved characteristics. Finally, the error term, ? it is assumed to have constant variance and to be uncorrelated across individuals and time.
We estimate the parameters of (2), including the fixed effects, by least squares. Thus, no matter how workers' permanent characteristics are related to their displacement status, our estimates of the displacement effects are unbiased. This estimation approach generalizes the "difference-indifferences" technique, which uses a comparison group to estimate the earnings changes that would have occurred in the absence of displacement, by accounting for the effects of time-varying variables and by allowing the effects of displacement to vary by the number of quarters relative to separation.
As we have noted, many studies have taken the simple change in earnings between a postdisplacement period and some base period as an estimate of displaced workers' losses. In terms of model (2), this is adequate only if the yv's are constant over time, 0 is zero, and the base period is sufficiently far before separation. Ruhm's (1991) estimates are not constrained in these ways but differ from ours in the treatment of unobserved heterogeneity.17 Specifically, he estimates cross-sectional regression models for postdisplacement earnings in which workers' predisplacement earnings are used as a control variable.18 Our approach also uses predisplacement earnings to control for unobserved heterogeneity, but it does so in the fashion model (2) implies is optimal.
As the discussion surrounding Figure 1 indicated, one potential problem with specification (2) is that it does not allow for the possibility that workers might have different trend rates of earnings growth and that firms might be more likely to lay off workers with more slowly growing earnings. This practice would cause us to overstate the effects of displacement. Accordingly, our second specification takes this possibility into account 15Our statistical model is similar to those used to evaluate the earnings impact of public-sector training programs (see Orley Ashenfelter, 1978; Heckman and Richard Robb, 1985; LaLonde, 1986).
16To identify the parameters of (2) we must observe the earnings of at least some displaced workers more than m quarters prior to their displacement. The choice of m = 20 presents us with no problems of identification, because there are six years of predisplacement data for even our first cohort of displaced workers who separated from their firms in the first quarter of 1980. Because we effectively identify the influence of macroeconomic factors, yt, and of age and sex, xito, on earnings by using data on all workers who did not separate from their firms between 1980 and 1986, our framework essentially compares changes indisplaced workers' earnings to those of the typical nondisplaced worker. As we noted above, it is also informative to compare displaced workers' earnings growth to that of nondisplaced workers from the same firms. Of course, we can only make this comparison for workers who were displaced from firms that continued to be in existence throughout the sample period. To compute this alternative estimator, first we subtracted from the quarterly earnings of each displaced worker the mean quarterly earnings of nondisplaced workers in their former firms. If workers who retain their jobs in firms that lay off other workers also suffer earnings losses, then the yjt's for those workers' firms will decline around the time that those layoffs occur, and as a result, the estimates of the 8k's based on (4) will be closer to zero. Moreover, the differences between displacement estimates obtained from (4) and (2) serve to gauge the size of losses suffered by workers who do not lose their jobs. The foregoing models describe the temporal pattern of displaced workers' earnings losses in a very flexible manner. In principle, they can be easily modified to summarize how this pattern varies among different groups of workers. The least restrictive modification interacts each displacement dummy variable, Dik, with variables indicating workers' gender, age, industry, or region. The problem with this approach is that it leads to a very large number of parameters. For example, because there are 48 pre-and postdisplacement time periods observed in the data, to characterize the earnings losses across 12 industires in the most flexible manner requires nearly 600 displacement parameters. Fortunately, after examining such estimates it became apparent that differences among groups in the time pattern of earnings losses occurred mainly along just three dimensions: the rate at which earnings "dip" in the period before separation, the size of the "drop" that occurs at the time of separation, and the rate of "recovery" in the period following separation.
We use the fact that differences in the losses among groups can be summarized by three magnitudes to construct a more parsimonious representation of losses across time If the second sum in (5') extends over all possible levels of a categorical variable, then the model will not be of full rank. However, instead of dropping the first dummy variable, which would be equivalent to setting p1 = 0 for 1' = 1,2,3, we impose the restrictions that E'pfjfj = 0 for 6 = 1, 2,3, where fj is the fraction of all displaced workers who are in group j. Alternatively, when worker characteristics are continuous rather than categorical variables, we subtract the variables' means over all displaced workers from their levels before forming the interaction terms in (5). The advantage of these parameterizations is that the average loss for all displaced workers for the kth quarter after separation simply equals 8k* Moreover, S0jj, (P2j, and 'p3j express the difference between the jth group's dip, drop, and recovery and those of the average displaced worker.
Below, we implement versions of (5) that simultaneously include interactions for workers' gender, age, industry, firm size, and local labor-market conditions. Such estimates show how earnings losses depend on these factors, controlling for other factors that affect the pattern of losses. For example, we present estimates of how the temporal pattern of earnings losses differs between men and women, after controlling for any differences in their ages, industries, firm sizes, and local labor-market conditions.
C. Potential Biases
The foregoing statistical framework addresses several sources of bias that have plagued many previous studies. In particular, it is worth noting that no biases arise in the least-squares estimation of (2) if firms choose whom to layoff partly on the basis of the permanent characteristics embodied in workers' fixed effects. Similarly, leastsquares estimation of (3) is unbiased even if firms tend to lay off workers partially on the basis of worker-specific fixed effects or time trends. However, our estimates are biased if firms selectively lay off employees whose performance was unusually poor in the quarters around the time of separation. In terms of our models, such behavior could be modeled by assuming that firms selectively lay off workers for whom the error term associated with the layoff date, Eis' is low.
The importance of any resulting biases depends critically on the time-series properties of the error terms. For example, when those errors are independent across time as we assumed above, such behavior biases only estimates of 80, the displacement effect associated with workers' dates of separation. Unfortunately, when the errors are correlated over time, estimates of other displacement coefficients are likely to be biased. The program-evaluation literature sometimes accounts for this source of bias by explicitly modeling the selection process and simultaneously estimating its parameters along with those of the earnings equation (see e.g., Ashenfelter and Card, 1985; Card and Sullivan, 1988) .
We have chosen not to estimate such a model because, for most commonly adopted specifications, doing so would have little or no impact on our estimates of long-run displacement effects. For example, if we assume that the error process for each individual is stationary, the spurious effects of displacement are symmetric about the date of separation.2' We show below that the estimated effects of displacement are close to zero for periods more than three years before separation. Therefore, because the spurious and true effects of displacement are of the same sign, it follows that during this period both are close to zero and thus that during the period more than three years after separation the spurious effects of displacement are zero. Alternatively, given the assumptioin of stationarity, the evidence on earnings losses before separation shows that by three years after separation the error will have completely "regressed to the mean," implying little or no bias in estimates of long-term displacement effects.
The above argument fails when the error process is nonstationary. In this case, when firms discharge recent poor performers, the mean of 5it conditional on displacement will not generally regress back to zero. Consequently, even our long-term loss estimates may be biased. However, we can substantially lessen the importance of this selectivity bias by restricting our analysis to workers who separate from firms that close all or a large part of their operations. Such workers are unlikely to have left their jobs as a result of their own poor performance. Therefore, in the empirical work that follows we give greater weight to the estimated earnings losses of workers in our mass-layoff sample.
III. Empirical Findings
The model developed in the previous section defines displaced workers' earnings losses as the difference between their quarterly earnings and their expected earnings had they remained with their former employer. We report estimates of that difference below for each quarter beginning with the 20th quarter prior to their separations and ending with the 27th quarter after their separations. To facilitate the exposition, we plot these estimated effects against the number of quarters before or after workers' separations.
A. Earnings Losses and Mass Layoffs
As shown by Figure 2 , we find that hightenure, prime-age workers endure substantial and persistent earnings losses when they 21See Heckman and Robb (1985) for a similar argument supporting the use of a symmetric differencein-differences estimator in the estimation of earnings impacts of training programs. We also find evidence that the events that lead to workers' separations cause their earnings to depart from their expected levels even before they leave their firms.24 As shown by Figure 2 , these workers' quarterly earnings begin to diverge meaningfully from their expected levels approximately three years prior to separtion. That divergence accelerates during the quarters immediately prior to separation, so that by the quarter prior to displacement, these workers' earnings are approximately $1,000 below their expected levels. Although we cannot determine from our data whether these preseparation declines result from cuts in real wages or weekly hours, in other work we find that the incidence of temporary layoffs increased 22Although not shown, the quarterly employment rates of the displaced workers in our sample depart only slightly from their expected levels, except for the year following separation. This behavior for displaced workers' employment rates is not surprising, because our sample excludes workers with extremely long spells without wage and salary earnings. Thus, the substantial earnings losses observed in Figure 2 are largely due to lower earnings for those who work, rather than an increase in the number of workers without quarterly earnings. 23Because our sample is large, the estimated standard errors are relatively small. For example, between the fifth year prior to workers' separations and the second quarter after their job losses the standard errors associated with the displacement effects average $30 per quarter. After that quarter, the standard errors increase, so that by the 20th quarter following the separations the standard errors are approximately $60. 24Ruhm (1991 p. 322; using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics), David Blanchflower (1991 p. 489; using data from Great Britain), and Sara Di la Rica (1992; using the DWS) each report that displaced workers' earnings declined prior to separation. 
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Our confidence in these results-that earnings losses are large and long-term and that they appear even before workers permanently lose their jobs-is enhanced because we do not find substantial estimated losses during the period 4-5 years before separation. Many forms of model misspecification would generate estimated "displacement effects" arbitrarily long before job loss. Instead, we find that estimated losses are small for time periods more than three years before separation. To explore this issue further, we relaxed the assumption of no displacement effects more than five years before separation by setting m in equation (2) equal to values of up to 10 years. In no case did we observe evidence of a meaningful displacement effect more than three years before workers' actual separations.
A different earnings-loss pattern emerges for workers from the non-mass-layoff sample. First, as shown by Figure 3 , depending on which model we used to estimate the losses, this group's earnings fully recover 3-5 years following their separations. Second, prior to separations, their earnings depart only slightly from their expected levels, and following separation they drop by only one-half as much as workers in the masslayoff sample. This pattern of earnings losses for the non-mass-layoff sample is not surprising, because this sample probably includes larger fractions of workers who quit their jobs or who had fewer firm-specific skills. Indeed, this pattern of losses for workers who are likely to adjust easily to separation enhances our confidence in our previous result that workers displaced during mass layoffs experience large earnings losses. The comparative ease of adjustment of workers in the non-mass-layoff sample demonstrates that there is nothing in our specification that necessarily generates large loss estimates.
The foregoing findings demonstrate that when estimating the effects of displacement it is important to have long time-series on workers' earnings histories as well as information about their firms. Studies that use data lacking these features, such as the DWS, have likely underestimated the earnings losses associated with worker displacement. For example, as shown by Figure 2 , displaced workers' earnings are abnormally low in the year prior to separation. As a result, if we had only one year of preseparation earnings data, our earnings-loss estimates would have been nearly 50-percent smaller than the estimate based on workers' long-term earnings histories. Likewise, we might have underestimated workers' earnings losses if we had to rely on displaced workers' assessments of their firms' economic well-being rather than the firms' administrative records. As indicated by Figure  3 , if workers who separated from "normal" firms report that they were laid off from distressed firms, researchers would understate the long-term losses associated with displacement.
B. Sensitivity of Losses to Comparison Group
In the foregoing analysis, high-tenure workers who remained with their firms for the entire sample period identified the influence of macroeconomic factors, Vt, and of age and sex, xit3, on earnings. As we previously observed, it is also of interest to compare displaced workers' earnings to those of nondisplaced workers in the same firm. The estimated earnings losses based on this alternative estimator should be smaller as long as nondisplaced workers in distressed firms have earnings that grow more slowly than those of other nondisplaced workers. Such a finding would suggest that nondisplaced workers' earnings are adversely affected by the events that lead to mass layoffs in their industry or firm.
As shown by Figure 4 , when we use the nondisplaced workers in displaced workers' former firms to identify the influence of macroeconomic factors, the estimated earn- 
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ence of macroeconomic factors.25 The gap between these two sets of estimates indicates that employees who remain employed during mass layoffs experience only modest declines in earnings relative to other nondisplaced workers. It is also apparent from Figure 4 that, because the gap between the two sets of estimates becomes large only after separation, nondisplaced workers in distressed firms fall behind other nondisplaced workers only after their firms lay off large numbers of workers. Before the mass layoffs, the displaced workers' earnings fall substantially relative to either comparison group of nondisplaced workers. This implies that when firms seem likely to reduce their workforces dramatically, it is probably apparent which employees are most likely to be permanently laid off, namely, those who have experienced temporary layoffs in the past. This result suggests that stayers in distressed firms may not accept significant cuts in their own earnings because they do not consider themselves at risk for job loss.
Turning to the non-mass-layoff sample, we find that our earnings-loss estimates do not depend on the comparison group. As shown in Figure 5 , the estimated earnings losses are the same whether or not we condition on a displaced worker's firm. This finding is not surprising, for when few employees separate from their firms it is unlikely that those separations would be associated with earnings losses for those who remain employed at the firm. Table 2 , we report estimates of these differences corresponding to differences in sex, decade of birth, industry, firm size, and local labor-market conditions. In addition, as a summary measure of groups' long-term losses, we report estimates of their losses during the fifth year following displacement. The set of columns on the left, labeled "without other controls," contains estimates of model (5) 398 (-545 -1,853) . Given the average level of losses, this estimate implies that during the fifth year after displacement men's losses amounted to $7,143, and women's losses amounted to $4,744.27
The difference observed above between men's and women's losses nearly disappears when we hold constant the distribution of workers' ages, industries, and firm sizes as well as local labor-market conditions at the time of their displacements. As shown by the second group of columns in Table 2 , the difference between men's and women's rates of preseparation declines falls to only $15 per quarter, and the difference between their initial postdisplacement losses falls to $453 per quarter. The latter figure suggests that the women in our sample had somewhat fewer firm-specific skills or were less likely to have been receiving wage premiums on their old jobs. Finally, holding constant other factors, in the period more than six quarters after separation, women are estimated to recover $20 per quarter more slowly than men. This result suggests that, other factors held constant, women are less likely to acquire new skills after their job losses.
What is most notable about the results for workers from different birth cohorts is 26The overall loss estimates obtained by estimating (5) for various sets of worker characteristics are quite similar to those plotted in Figure 2 and are therefore not shown. 27The estimates in the columns labeled "fifth year loss dif' are equal to four times the drop estimate plus 50 times the recovery estimate. The coefficient on the drop estimate is four because the drop estimate applies to each of the four quarters in the fifth year after displacement. The coefficient on the recovery coefficient is 50 because that is the sum of the values (11, 12, 13, and 14) that the recovery time trend takes on during the fifth year after displacement. The estimates labeled "fifth year loss" are equal to those labeled "fifth year loss dif' plus the average loss during the fifth year after displacement, which in terms of model (5) that the differences between these groups' patterns of losses are generally very small. Younger workers have a somewhat greater rate of decline in the period before separation, probably reflecting a greater vulnerability to temporary layoffs due to lower levels of seniority, but the difference is barely statistically significant. Younger workers also have a larger drop in earnings in the period after displacement, but when other controls are included, the gap in quarterly losses between workers born in the 1930's and those born in the 1950's is estimated to be only $113. The larger initial losses suffered by younger workers are quickly canceled by their faster rate of recovery. During the period more than six quarters after separation, the youngest group of workers have earnings that recover $19.4 per quarter faster than those of the oldest workers. As a result, in the fifth year after separation, the oldest workers lose $521 more than the youngest workers. The finding of more slowly growing earnings of older workers is consistent with their facing a shorter time horizon and thus being less likely to acquire new skills. Our results on how losses vary with the characteristics of displaced workers' former firms indicate that workers' earnings losses are substantial across a broad range of industries and firm sizes. The pattern of losses for workers displaced from industries as diverse as nondurable manufacturing, motor vehicles, and wholesale and retail trade closely resembles the pattern depicted in Figure 2 . Likewise, the pattern of losses for workers displaced from smaller firms, with between 50 and 500 employees, is similar to the pattern for workers displaced from larger firms, with between 2,000 and 5,000 employees.
Although workers experience large losses regardless of their industry or firm size, these characteristics are nevertheless important determinants of the magnitude of their losses. The differences in the magnitude of losses across both industries and firm sizes suggest that the loss of rents, including union premiums, may contribute to workers' earnings losses. Losses were especially large, both prior to and after displacement, among workers separating from the heavily unionized mining and construction, primary metals, and transportation, communications, and public-utility sectors. Consistent with this evidence on the potential loss of rents, we also find much larger losses among workers displaced from very large firms. By contrast, losses were relatively small among workers displaced from the largely nonunion business and professional service and financial sectors.
To assess the importance of labor-market conditions on workers' losses, we included in c1 in equation (5) Table 2 indicate that workers displaced during particularly adverse cyclical conditions have losses after five years that are nearly $1,500 larger than those experienced by workers displaced during the best cyclical conditions. Like industry and firm size, local labormarket conditions are important determinants of earnings losses. It is important to recognize, however, that even workers displaced in strong labor markets experience large losses. Our figures indicate that workers displaced in the best of circumstances have losses that are at most only one-third less severe than the average losses depicted in Figure 2 .30 This finding suggests that some valuable attribute of the employment relationship itself is lost when high-tenure workers are displaced. Manufacturing workers' earnings losses depend crucially on whether they obtain new jobs in the manufacturing sector. As shown by Table 3 , the losses of those who leave the manufacturing sector equal 38 percent of their predisplacement earnings.32 However, for those who found new jobs in the manufacturing sector it does not appear to matter whether they found a job in their old four-digit industry. As shown in panel A, 24 quarters after their separations workers' losses were 20 percent of predisplacement earnings if they found new jobs in the same four-digit industry, compared with 18 who found new employment in the same industry experienced large and persistent losses.
IV. Conclusion
Consistent with previous research using other data sets, we have shown that hightenure workers experience substantial earnings losses when they leave their jobs. In addition, we have shown that, for workers displaced from distressed firms, these losses (i) are long-term, with little evidence of substantial recovery after the third year; (ii) arise even prior to workers' separations; (iii) vary modestly with local labor-market conditions, industry, and firm size; (iv) do not depend very much on workers' gender and age; and (v) are substantial even for those who find new jobs in similar firms.
The significance of these results is heightened by the large number of workers adversely affected by structural change during the first half of the 1980's. Because we employed a 5-percent sample of Pennsylvania workers, we estimate that approximately 135,000 of that state's high-tenure workers were permanently laid off from distressed firms. Further, because approximately 5 percent of U.S. workers are employed in Pennsylvania, if the rest of the nation experienced similar rates of displacement, our results represent the experiences of 2.6 million workers nationwide. This estimate agrees closely with the number of hightenure prime-age displaced workers reported by the DWS during approximately the same period.33
Our findings also bear on the importance of several alternative theories of why job losses should be costly. First, losses are larger in settings where unions or rent-sharing are likely to be prevalent. Second, longterm losses depend modestly on businesscycle conditions at the time of workers' job losses. This result is consistent with implicitcontracting models of wage determination (see Paul Beaudry and John DiNardo, 1991). Third, the relatively slow rates of earnings recovery after workers secure new jobs suggests that wage gains generated from idiosyncratic job-matching must accrue slowly over time. Finally, our results indicate that there is something intrinsic to the employment relationship itself that is lost when workers are displaced. If it is workers' skills that are lost, these skills must be firm-specific, as opposed to industry-specific. Alternatively, such earnings losses may result from the workings of internal labor markets. Although we cannot assess the relative importance of these two alternatives, our finding that losses are large for almost every group we studied suggests that wage premiums-whether due to firm-specific skills or to internal labor markets-must be commonplace.
APPENDIX
A. Constructing the Data
We constructed our longitudinal data from a 5-percent sample of workers included in Pennsylvania Unemployment Insurance (UI) tax reports and the state ES202 data on firms' employment. The firms' UI tax records report the quarterly wage and salary earnings for each employee. Because the state requires accurate and timely information to calculate unemploymentinsurance taxes and workers' benefits, it cross-checks these earnings records against earlier reports and federal corporate tax returns. In these data, employers report their employees' total earnings; unlike Social Security earnings data, these data are not top-coded. For a portion of the sample, the UI tax records also identify workers' sex, age, and race, data that the state obtained from the Social Security Administration in 1976. Unfortunately, even for workers who were in the Pennsylvania labor force in 1976, this information is sometimes missing. 33To obtain the latter number, we applied the same tenure and age restrictions used in our study to the 1984 and 1986 DWS's. We counted persons who were displaced from full-time private nonagricultural jobs, but we excluded persons who reported that they had been self-employed or were displaced for unspecified reasons. Like our sample, the resulting DWS sample covered a seven-year period, but it began in 1979 instead of 1980.
The ES202 reports provide the information about firms' employment that the Bureau of Labor Statistics uses to compile its reports on employment and earnings. A key element of our analysis is that we use the information on the sources of workers' earnings to track accurately their separations from individual firms. Thus, it is important to account for cases in which a firm's employer identification number (EIN) changes from one period to the next, creating the appearance of a closing followed by an opening of a new firm. Fortunately, the Pennsylvania ES202 data include files detailing EIN changes which we were able to use to construct a consistent set of corrected EIN's. In several years, well over 5 percent of total employment was affected by EIN changes. Indeed, had we not eliminated bogus changes, such changes would be the primary source of movement of workers between employers with the same four-digit SIC but different EIN's. In cases of mergers and divestitures that occurred during the sample period, we treated the separate parts as a single firm, even in years when they were legally distinct.
Finally, we created our longitudinal file by merging UI tax reports and ES202 records with the same corrected EIN. Both sets of data also include a plant identification number; but the coding schemes differ between the two files, so that we were unable to obtain an employment figure for each worker's establishment. The resulting file contains workers' quarterly earnings from 1974 to 1987 and, for each calendar year, their principal employers' EIN, fourdigit SIC industry, location, and average employment during the last, current, and following years. To keep the data-processing to a manageable level, we only attached data on the employment of the firm from which the worker received the greatest amount of earnings during the year.
B. Dating Workers' Separations
We used two pieces of information from our Pennsylvania data to determine which workers separated from their firms and when those separations occurred. First, a change from one year to the next in the EIN of a worker's principal employer was taken to indicate his separation from his incumbent firm. Second, data on the percentage of total quarterly earnings received from the year's principal employer were used to date the quarter of that separation. In particular, we attempted to determine the last quarter that the employee received earnings from the old principal employer. When this quarter was clearly in the last year when the old employer was still the principal employer, the quarter of separation was the last quarter of positive earnings from that employer. For example, if the worker has earnings from the old employer in the third but not the fourth quarter of the last year when the old employer was the principal employer, we declare the separation to have occurred in the third quarter of that year. However, when the worker derived 100 percent of his fourth-quarter earnings from the old principal employer, the separation date was taken to be the quarter of the following year in which the employee last received earnings from sources other than the new principal employer. For example, if the worker receives all of his earnings from the new employer in the second but not the first quarter of the first year the new employer is the principal employer, we declare the separation to have occurred in the first quarter of that year.
In most instances the foregoing procedure precisely dates the separation. There appear to be two exceptions: first, when the worker has another wage or salary job besides the job with the incumbent firm; second, when the incumbent firm grants the employee severance pay after displacement. Both of those exceptions may cause us to date the separation after it actually occurred. Thus, our dating procedure may cause displaced workers' earnings to appear falsely to decline during the quarters prior to displacement. However our finding reported in the text, showing that predisplacement earnings losses are small in the nonmass-layoff sample, would imply that if there was a problem with our dating of separations, it would only occur when workers separate from distressed firms. We know of no reason why that should be the case in these data.
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